Wicker v. Consolidated Rail by unknown
1998 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-29-1998 
Wicker v. Consolidated Rail 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998 
Recommended Citation 
"Wicker v. Consolidated Rail" (1998). 1998 Decisions. 95. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998/95 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1998 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed April 29, 1998 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
Nos. 97-3034, 97-3035, 97-3036 
97-3037 and 97-3038 
 
EDWARD L. WICKER, SR., 
       Appellant at No. 97-3034 
 
SAMUEL D. WEAVER, 
       Appellant at No. 97-3035 
 
THOMAS E. KLEINER, 
       Appellant at No. 97-3036 
 
JOHN W. McKEE, 
       Appellant at No. 97-3037 
 
JOHN M. KALTENBRUNNER, 
       Appellant at No. 97-3038 
 
v. 
 
CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action Nos. 93-cv-00041J, 94-cv-00015J 
94-cv-00036J, 94-cv-00132J and 95-cv-00105J) 
 
Argued September 23, 1997 
 
Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, SCIRICA and McKEE, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: April 29, 1998) 
 
 
  
       JAMES M. FLOOD, ESQUIRE 
       (ARGUED) 
       HOWARD S. STEVENS, ESQUIRE 
       Stevens & Johnson 
       740 Hamilton Mall 
       Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101 
 
        Attorneys for Appellants 
 
       STEPHEN M. HOUGHTON, ESQUIRE 
       (ARGUED) 
       PETER T. STINSON, ESQUIRE 
       Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote 
       Two PPG Place, Suite 400 
       Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222-5402 
 
        Attorneys for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
The issue on appeal is whether S 5 of the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act1 voids a general release of claims 
given as part of a negotiated settlement. 
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
Plaintiffs Edward Wicker, Sr., Samuel Weaver, Thomas 
Kleiner, John McKee and John Kaltenbrunner are all 
former employees of defendant Consolidated Railroad 
Corporation who were injured during the course of their 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 5 of FELA provides: 
 
       Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose 
or 
       intent of which shall be to enable the common carrier to exempt 
       itself from any liability created by this chapter, shall to that 
extent 
       be void . . . . 
 
45 U.S.C. S 55 (1986). 
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employment. Each plaintiff negotiated a settlement of 
claims with Conrail and executed a release. While the 
releases were not identical, each appeared to settle all 
claims for all injuries past and future. Plaintiffs 
subsequently suffered injuries as a result of exposure to 
toxic chemicals at Conrail's Hollidaysburg Reclamation 
Plant in Blair County, Pennsylvania. 
 
B. 
 
Edward Wicker retired from Conrail in 1982. Before 
retiring, Wicker suffered injuries as a result of exposure to 
asbestos and, in January 1988, signed a release settling his 
asbestos related claims. Wicker believed the release related 
solely to his asbestos injuries, and testified he would not 
have executed a release with a broader scope. Wicker 
claims he was also exposed to trichlorethylene and 
trichloroethane while employed at Conrail, and may have 
been exposed to other toxic chemicals without his 
knowledge. Wicker now suffers from blackouts, seizures, 
vertigo, stiffness in his hands, and burn spots in front of 
his eyes, all of which he attributes to his exposure to 
chemicals while employed at Conrail. He does not believe 
any of his injuries are related to asbestos exposure, the 
subject of his initial settlement. 
 
Samuel Weaver was employed by Conrail from 1974 until 
1991. In February 1989, Weaver severely injured his back 
on the job. In September 1991, Weaver signed a release and 
a Letter of Agreement not to return to work. Weaver 
believed the release related only to his back injury, and 
said he would not have signed it otherwise. Weaver testified 
that he was exposed to chemicals during the course of his 
employment, and alleges that he suffers from swollen eyes, 
infected tear ducts, nosebleeds, headaches, respiratory 
difficulties, an enlarged liver, skin rashes, dizziness, 
lipomas, cracking lips, indigestion, overgrowth of skin on 
his thumbs, xerodermatitis, shortness of breath, fatigue, 
black mucous substances in his mouth and nose, foot 
numbness, muscle cramps, spastic colon and benign 
lumps. Weaver claims that while some symptoms existed at 
the time he executed the release, many are recent 
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developments which were not discovered until after he had 
signed the release. 
 
Thomas Kleiner was exposed to asbestos while employed 
by Conrail. In August 1992, Kleiner signed a general 
release. Kleiner's attorney, Robert Kosseff, testified that 
neither he nor Kleiner were aware at the time the release 
was executed that Kleiner had been injured by exposure to 
chemicals other than asbestos. Kleiner said that he was 
exposed to various chemicals when he worked on a "slop 
truck," cleaning out vats filled with caustic soda, soaps, 
cleaners, chlorinated solvents, and other chemical wastes. 
As a result, Kleiner suffers from respiratory difficulties, 
black mucous in his nose and mouth, skin rashes, fatigue, 
headaches, chest pain, numbness, muscle cramps, nose 
bleeds, coughing and sinusitis. 
 
In April, 1990, John McKee injured his back while 
working for Conrail and, as a result, was unable to work for 
approximately two years. He returned to work briefly and 
before retiring signed a release and letter of agreement on 
September 11, 1992, similar to those signed by Weaver. At 
the time he executed the release, McKee was represented by 
Robert Kosseff, who testified that neither he nor his client 
was aware that McKee had been injured by exposure to 
toxic chemicals. McKee suffers from headaches, respiratory 
difficulties, nausea, light headedness, skin rashes, chronic 
indigestion, a bleeding stomach ulcer, kidney stones, blood 
clots, nervous disorder, and dermatitis. Although McKee 
testified that he had experienced many of these symptoms 
before executing the release, he explained that hefirst 
connected his symptoms to chemical exposure after he 
signed the release. 
 
John Kaltenbrunner injured his back in April 1990 while 
employed by Conrail. In November 1994, Kaltenbrunner 
signed a release, and a letter of agreement identical to 
those signed by Weaver and McKee stating that he would 
not return to his job. Kaltenbrunner testified he was 
unaware of his exposure to toxic chemicals during his 
employment, and that, as a result, he suffers injuries apart 
from his back injury, including rashes, joint pain, 
respiratory problems, sinusitis, skin "eruptions," and 
Legionnaires Disease. Kaltenbrunner also testified that 
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some of these symptoms manifested themselves before 
executing the release. 
 
C. 
 
The releases signed by Wicker and Kleiner were similar in 
form and substance, and appear to release Conrail from 
liability for all claims, both past and future, relating to their 
employment. Wicker's release provides, in part: 
 
       I, Edward Wicker . . . for the sole consideration of 
       Twenty-one Thousand Dollars ($21,000) . . . hereby 
       release and hereby discharge Consolidated Rail 
       Corporation . . . from any and all losses, claims, 
       liabilities, actions, causes of action . . . and demands 
       of any kind whatsoever in nature . . . which I have or 
       to which I claim to be entitled by reason of any 
       injuries, known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen 
       . . . which now exist or which may arise in the future 
       as a result of or in any way connected with my alleged 
       exposure to any material, substance, product, and/or 
       good(s) of any kind or nature (including but not limited 
       to dust, fumes, vapors, mists, gases, agents, asbestos 
       or toxic substances of any kind) supplied or permitted 
       to exist by [Conrail], and/or arising out of any working 
       condition, of any kind, during my employment by 
       [Conrail] . . . . 
 
       I hereby declare and represent that the injuries and 
       illnesses which have been or may be sustained, 
       including mental conditions resulting from asbestos 
       exposure or exposure to any substance, condition or 
       environment or a belief that I was exposed to asbestos, 
       or any substance, condition or environment, are, or 
       may be permanent, and that recovery therefrom is 
       uncertain and indefinite, and that they may cause or 
       lead to other deleterious conditions, including but not 
       limited to cancer, and that in making this Release, it is 
       understood and agreed that I rely wholly upon my own 
       judgment, belief, and knowledge of the nature, extent, 
       effect, duration, and other possible results of said 
       injuries, illnesses, conditions, exposures, and liability 
       therefore, and that the release is made without reliance 
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       upon any statement or representation by [Conrail] . . . 
       and that possible future conditions, as yet undetected, 
       including but not limited to cancers of any kind, are 
       included. 
 
McKee and Weaver each signed a standard release form 
entitled "General Release." These releases provide in part: 
 
       I, [Plaintiff] hereby release and forever discharge 
       [Conrail] from all claims, demands, actions and causes 
       of action of every kind whatsoever and including but 
       without limitation of the foregoing, all liability for 
       damages, costs, expenses and compensation of any 
       kind, nature or description now existing or which may 
       hereafter arise from or out of injuries and damages, 
       known or unknown, permanent or otherwise, sustained 
       or received by [plaintiff arising from the specific 
       incident being settled]. 
 
The release signed by Kaltenbrunner, while similar to 
those signed by Weaver and McKee, also contains a 
separate exclusion preserving his claims for carpal tunnel 
syndrome. That release provides in part: 
 
       I, John M. Kaltenbrunner, for the sole consideration of 
       Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) . . . do hereby 
       release and forever discharge [Conrail] from all claims, 
       demands, actions and causes of action of every kind 
       whatsoever and including, but without limitation of the 
       foregoing, all liability for damages, costs, expenses and 
       all incidents, illnesses, diseases, conditions, injuries 
       and damages, known or unknown, permanent or 
       otherwise . . . . 
 
       THIS RELEASE SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDES ANY 
       CLAIMS OR CAUSES OF ACTION THAT JOHN 
       KALTENBRUNNER HAS OR MAY HAVE IN THE 
       NATURE OF OCCUPATIONALLY RELATED CARPAL 
       TUNNEL SYNDROME OR OCCUPATIONALLY RELATED 
       REPETITIVE MOTION INJURIES INVOLVING THE 
       UPPER EXTREMITIES ONLY BUT DOES NOT WAIVE 
       ANY SUBSTANTIVE OR PROCEDURAL DEFENSES 
       THERETO. 
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D. 
 
Each plaintiff brought suit under FELA, alleging various 
injuries because of exposure to hazardous and toxic 
substances during the course of their employment with 
Conrail. Conrail sought summary judgment, citing the 
previously executed releases. Contending the releases 
barred only their claims for back injury and asbestos 
exposure, plaintiffs raised contract defenses of mutual 
mistake, fraud, ambiguity and lack of consideration. They 
also argued the releases were unenforceable underS 5 of 
FELA, 45 U.S.C.A. S 55 (1986). The district court 
consolidated the cases and granted Conrail's motions. This 
appeal followed. 
 
E. 
 
The able district judge observed that the executed 
releases "contain language which, on its face, relieves the 
defendant from future liability for any type of damage or 
harm suffered by the plaintiffs while in the railroad's 
employ." Edward L. Wicker, Sr., et al. v. Consolidated Rail 
Corporation, Civ. Nos. 93-41J, 94-15J, 94-36J, 94-132J, 
95-105J (W.D. Pa. December 31, 1996) ("Wicker") at 6. 
Finding the language of the releases unambiguous and no 
evidence of mutual mistake, the court rejected plaintiffs' 
contract defenses. Because plaintiffs were represented by 
counsel and the releases were negotiated at arm's length, 
the court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that these were 
contracts of adhesion. 
 
Addressing plaintiffs' FELA defense, the court 
acknowledged the split of authority on the enforceability of 
broadly written releases. It then turned to its recent 
decision in Wicker v. Conrail, Civ. No. 94-16J (December 
19, 1996) ("Wicker II"), which "accorded great weight to the 
plaintiff 's continuing employment with Conrail after 
settlement of his [original claim]." Wicker at 18. By 
contrast, each plaintiff here negotiated his release in the 
context of terminating, or already having terminated, his 
employment with Conrail. According to the court, these 
releases "served the beneficial purpose of adjusting, and 
providing finality to, all claims between the parties." Id. 
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The district court also looked to Wilson v. CSX Transp. 
Inc., Civ. No. 91-1398, slip op., (W.D. Pa. March 9, 1994), 
in which plaintiff sued his employer for shoulder injuries 
sustained in a work-related accident. Through settlement, 
plaintiff released his employer from "all claims, suits, [etc.] 
. . . which the [plaintiff] has or might have against [the 
railroad] . . . for any and all injuries . . . occurring prior to 
the date of [the release], including but not limited to 
injuries arising out of or in any way connected with[the 
shoulder injury]." Wilson, slip op. at 4. The term "injury" 
was defined in the release to include both known and 
unknown injuries. Several years later, plaintiff sued for an 
occupational hearing loss, arguing the claim was not barred 
because the release related only to claims arising from the 
injury to his shoulder, and the hearing loss did not accrue 
until after the settlement was signed. Granting the 
railroad's motion for summary judgment, the court noted 
the release specifically encompassed all injuries occurring 
prior to the date of settlement, regardless of whether 
plaintiff was aware of them. The Wilson court also noted the 
general release at issue "indicates that the parties were 
settling all known and unknown claims of injury . . . [and] 
that the parties were severing their relationship for all time 
and defendant was `buying its peace' with plaintiff as to any 
such injuries." Wilson at 7. 
 
In addition, the district court here reasoned that the 
economic motivation behind negotiating a broadly worded 
release is consistent with the congressional purposes of 
FELA. The court found that persons who sign general 
releases tend to receive larger settlements, and that 
defendants are willing to pay higher sums to settle claims 
under a general release.2 This, together with plaintiffs' 
representation by counsel led the court to believe that 
enforcement of the releases was "in the interest of both 
parties, when viewed from the time of the negotiating of the 
agreement." Wicker at 20. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. "Broadly worded releases negotiated with departing or retired 
employees, as a matter of economic analysis, do not permit a FELA 
employer to exempt itself from future liability . . . [because] the liable 
employer under such a release pays the full discounted value of the 
known and unknown injuries of the settling parties." Wicker at 20. 
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F. 
 
On appeal, plaintiffs have abandoned their arguments of 
mutual mistake, fraud, ambiguity, and lack of 
consideration. Their appeal relies entirely on the assertion 
that their executed general releases are void under S 5 of 
FELA, 45 U.S.C.A. S 55 (1986). Plaintiffs contend they were 
unaware of either the injuries or the cause of those injuries 
at the time the releases were executed, and offer supporting 
affidavits from the attorneys who represented them at the 
time. The releases are invalid, they claim, because "[u]nder 
FELA a release is only valid if it compromises a claimed 
liability." Pls.' Brief at 11. Consequently, S 5 of FELA 
"prevents workers from releasing claims which they do not 
know existed at the time they executed a release for a 
separate known claim." Id. Plaintiffs maintain a general 
release of unknown and future claims does not bar later 
claims for injuries unknown at the time the release was 
executed. Id. at 13 (citing Forry, Inc. v. Neundorfer, Inc., 837 
F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1988)); see also Lanham v CSX Transp. 
Inc., 1995 WL 368171 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 1995)(finding that 
a general release executed in settlement of an employee's 
claim for a back injury did not bar a subsequent claim for 
an occupational disease of which the employee was 
unaware when he executed the release). 
 
Conrail relies on the district court's analysis, especially 
the distinction between current and former employees. 
Because the releases were executed as part of a settlement 
of existing claims and the termination of employment, 
Conrail contends they were meant to put to rest all present 
and future claims. Conrail also contends plaintiffs' asserted 
symptoms or injuries existed before they executed the 
releases. Thus, even if the releases cover only those injuries 
manifest at the time of settlement, the "new" injuries were 
nonetheless released because plaintiffs were on notice of a 
potential health problem at that time. 
 
G. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331 and 45 U.S.C. S 51, as well as supplemental 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1367. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
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We exercise plenary review of a grant of summary 
judgment. Dyszel v. Marks, 6 F.3d 116, 123 (3d Cir. 1993). 
We apply the same test as the district court. Berner Int'l 
Corp. v. Mars Sales Co., 987 F.2d 975, 978 (3d Cir. 1993). 
In so doing, we must view all evidence and draw all 
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non- 
moving party. Id. In this case, the party attacking the 
validity of the release bears the burden of proof as to its 
invalidity. Callen v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 332 U.S. 625, 630 
(1948). 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
In this appeal we must interpret the scope of S 5 of FELA, 
and in particular, whether its bar of "[a]ny contract . . . the 
purpose of which shall be to enable [an employer] to exempt 
itself" from FELA includes a general release of claims 
executed by an employee as part of a settlement. A brief 
review of the history of FELA and the accompanying case 
law is warranted. 
 
In 1908, FELA "was enacted because the Congress was 
dissatisfied with the common-law duty of the master to his 
servant." Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 
507 (1957). Congress sought to "ensure that the employees' 
suits would not be defeated by the same devices which 
Congress perceived to have been used in the immediate 
past by the railroads to avoid liability." Damron v. Norfolk & 
W. Ry. Co., 925 F. Supp. 520, 523 (N.D. Ohio 1995). Thus, 
FELA was designed "to enable injured railroad workers to 
overcome a number of traditional defenses to tort liability 
that had previously operated to bar their actions." Lewy v. 
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 799 F.2d 1281, 1287 (9th Cir. 
1986). For example, the Act abolished the doctrine of 
assumption of risk, applied comparative rather than 
contributory negligence, and sought to prevent employers 
from contracting out of FELA liability. See S. Rep. 460, 
60th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1908). With respect to the last of 
these, Congress noted that many railroads "insist[ed] on a 
contract with their employees, discharging the company 
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from liability for personal injuries." H.R. Rep. 1386, 60th 
Cong. 1st Sess. 6 (1908). Section 5 was passed specifically 
to remedy this problem. 
 
B. 
 
Shortly after FELA's adoption, the Supreme Court began 
to establish the boundaries of S 5. The Court upheld the 
validity of S 5 in Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 
U.S. 1, 52 (1912), noting that "if Congress possesses the 
power to impose liability . . . it also possesses the power to 
insure its efficacy by prohibiting any contract, rule, 
regulation or device in evasion of it." The same year, the 
Court examined S 5 in the context of a relief fund 
agreement by which acceptance of benefits constituted a 
release of all claims against the employer. Philadelphia, B. 
& W.R. Co. v. Schubert, 224 U.S. 603 (1912). Reasoning 
that this stipulation was simply a way for the employer to 
avoid liability by contract, and that it fell within the scope 
of S 5, the court held the release violated FELA. Id. at 612. 
 
Although Schubert addressed only agreements signed 
before injury, the Court later extended the bar to releases 
signed after injury. Duncan v. Thompson, 315 U.S. 1, 5-6 
(1942). In Duncan, the injured employee accepted $600 to 
cover his living expenses, agreeing to return the money in 
the event he brought suit against the employer. When the 
employee filed a claim without first refunding the $600, the 
railroad raised the contract as a defense. Focusing on 
whether "the purpose or intent" of the agreement was to 
enable the employer "to exempt itself from any liability" 
under FELA, the Court noted that, because of Duncan's 
financial condition, requiring the refund before commencing 
suit was tantamount to depriving him of the right tofile 
suit, thereby exempting the employer from liability. Id. at 7. 
It also noted the $600 was specifically earmarked for living 
expenses, and the agreement was a form commonly used to 
benefit employees until final settlement was negotiated. Id. 
at 7-8. Consequently, it declined to discuss the validity of 
a release signed as part of a bona fide settlement, finding 
that the "very language of the agreement indicates it is not 
a compromise and settlement." Id. 
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The Court addressed that issue in Callen v. Pennsylvania 
R. Co., 332 U.S. 625 (1948), where a railroad employee 
brought a FELA action after injuring his back in a work- 
related accident. As a defense, the railroad pleaded a 
general release executed by the employee, signed in 
exchange for $250, that relieved the railroad of "all claims 
and demands which [plaintiff] can or may have against the 
said Pennsylvania Railroad Co. for or by reason of personal 
injuries sustained." Callen, 332 U.S. at 626. Plaintiff 
claimed that when he signed the release he was unaware 
he had a permanent injury. Although the primary issue on 
appeal was whether the trial judge had improperly 
withdrawn the question of the release's validity from the jury,3 
the Court also addressed whether the release violated S 5 of 
FELA. Rejecting this argument, the Court said: 
 
       It is obvious that a release is not a device to exempt 
       from liability but is a means of compromising a claimed 
       liability and to that extent recognizing its possibility. 
       Where controversies exist as to whether there is 
       liability, and if so for how much, Congress has not said 
       that parties may not settle their claims without 
       litigation. 
 
Id. at 631. The language is clear. Releases are not per se 
invalid under FELA. Although the Court did not explain 
what will qualify as a "compromis[e] [of] a claimed liability" 
it did say that parties may settle "[w]here controversies 
exist as to whether there is liability, and if so for how 
much." The explicit requirement is that a controversy must 
exist. 
 
The Court provided some clarification in Boyd v. Grand 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Supreme Court held that the validity of the release was a jury 
question and that the trial judge's misleading instructions had 
effectively 
withdrawn the issue from the jury's consideration. The Court also 
rejected the argument that the burden of proof with respect to validity 
should be shifted to the railroad, noting that, regardless of the 
potential 
inequality of bargaining power between the parties, such a change was 
appropriately left to the discretion of Congress. Thus, until Congress 
"adopt[s] a policy depriving settlements of litigation of their prima 
facie 
validity . . . the releases of railroad employees stand on the same basis 
as the releases of others." Id. at 630. 
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Trunk W.R. Co., 338 U.S. 263, 266 (1949), noting that its 
Callen decision "distinguished a full compromise enabling 
the parties to settle their dispute without litigation, which 
we held did not contravene the Act, from a device which 
obstructs the right of the Liability Act plaintiff to secure the 
maximum recovery if he should elect judicial trial of his 
cause." In Boyd, the railroad advancedfifty dollars to its 
employee twice during the month following his work-related 
injury. On each occasion, the employee signed an 
agreement which provided that, if he elected to sue, "such 
suit shall be commenced within the county or district 
where I resided at the time my injuries were sustained, or 
in the county or district where my injuries were sustained 
and not elsewhere." Id. at 264. The employee brought his 
claim in a different venue and the employer sued to enjoin 
the action. Examining the venue provision contained in S 6 
of FELA,4 the Supreme Court held"the right to select the 
forum granted in s. 6 is a substantial right." Id. at 266. 
Consequently, "contracts limiting the choice of venue" 
obstruct a FELA plaintiff's fundamental right of recovery, 
and are therefore "void as conflicting with[S 5 of] the 
[Federal Employers'] Liability Act."5 Id. at 265. 
 
Despite this ruling, the proper application and reach of 
S 5 remains unclear. One reason may be that the Court's 
decisions rejecting general releases as bars to subsequent 
claims have been fact-driven, and consequently do not 
provide a generally applicable rule of law. Although the 
Supreme Court in Callen refused to void the releases 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Section 6 of FELA provides, in part: 
 
       Under this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of 
       the United States, in the district of the residence of the 
defendant, 
       or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant 
       shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action. 
 
45 U.S.C. S 56 (1986). 
 
5. In addition to voiding general releases of FELA claims under S 5, the 
Court has also held such releases void on the grounds of fraud, Dice v. 
Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 362 (1952), and lack 
of consideration, Maynard v. Durham & S. Ry. Co., 365 U.S. 160 (1961). 
Neither holding, however, provides any guidance as to the proper 
application of S 5. 
 
                                13 
  
executed in compromise of an employee's claims, the Court 
has not had occasion to explain how wide a net its ruling 
casts. Nonetheless, the case law provides us with some 
rough guidelines. 
 
C. 
 
To begin with, Schubert underscores that S 5 of FELA was 
designed to prevent employers from making the waiver of 
claims a quid pro quo of the employment contract. Unlike 
this case, Schubert dealt with a release that was signed 
before the employee was injured, clearly the type of 
contractual "shield" FELA was designed to prevent. 
Nonetheless, Schubert makes clear that Congress intended 
to prevent employers from depriving their employees of the 
right to recover for job-related injuries. 
 
Duncan and Callen are also instructive. In Duncan the 
Court began shaping the requirements of S 5, concluding 
that the release was not part of a compromise and 
settlement. Callen was more specific and explicitly 
permitted releases "where controversies exist." Of course 
the release in Callen addressed only a specific injury. 
 
Boyd holds that a FELA plaintiff may not waive his 
fundamental rights under the statute.6  But Boyd relied on 
the specific venue provision in S 6 of FELA to support its 
conclusion that S 5 prohibited a waiver of venue. As noted, 
there is no specific section of the statute which addresses 
the rights of FELA plaintiffs to settle their claims. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Court has held, in the context of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
that an employee cannot waive certain statutorily conferred rights. See 
Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945) (noting that a 
"statutory right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public 
interest, may not be waived or released if such waiver or release 
contravenes the statutory policy" and thus the plaintiffs could not waive 
minimum or overtime wages or liquidated damages); D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. 
Gangi, 328 U.S. 108 (1946) (holding that an employee could not waive 
his right to liquidated damage, even if the release is made in settlement 
of a bona fide dispute as to coverage). While it is arguable that this is 
analogous to an employee waiving his fundamental right to file a FELA 
claim, making a general release invalid, the Court's decision in Callen 
would appear to undercut this reasoning. 
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In South Buffalo Ry. Co. v. Ahern, 344 U.S. 367 (1953), 
the Court upheld a provision of the New York Workers' 
Compensation Law that effectively allowed an employee to 
waive its FELA rights. Plaintiff had been awarded $28 per 
week under the New York Workers' Compensation Law for 
injuries sustained while employed as a switchman. Two 
years later, after the employee died -- and his remedy 
under FELA had lapsed -- the employer attacked the award 
on the ground that the Workers' Compensation Board did 
not have jurisdiction. According to the employer, S 113 of 
the statute, which granted the Board jurisdiction to hear 
claims for injuries "subject to the admiralty or other federal 
laws," was unconstitutional as applied because permitting 
the Board to hear claims covered by FELA constituted a 
waiver of an employee's FELA rights. The Supreme Court 
disagreed. Noting that S 113 was permissive, and did not 
coerce an employee to give up its federal rights, the Court 
held that S 113 of the New York Workers' Compensation 
Law did not constitute an impermissible waiver under S 5 of 
FELA.7 
 
The New York statute at issue in Ahern -- allowing waiver 
of an employee's FELA claims when he or she receives 
compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law-- is 
arguably no different than a private agreement to waive 
such claims as part of a settlement between the employee 
and the employer. But the facts of the case counsel against 
extracting such a clearly defined rule of law. Unlike 
plaintiffs here, who have filed claims unrelated to their 
previous injuries, the employee in Ahern received benefits 
for injuries received in a specific accident only. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Court reviewed another attack on a FELA release in its per curiam 
decision in Hogue v. Southern R. Co, 390 U.S. 516 (1968). The issue in 
that case was whether a plaintiff who attacks the validity of a previously 
executed release must return the consideration paid for that release 
prior to commencing his FELA action. While the Court did not find it 
necessary to "decide whether the release here involved violated s. 5," it 
noted that "a rule which required a refund as a prerequisite to 
institution of suit would be `wholly incongruous with the general policy 
of the Act to give railroad employees a right to recover just compensation 
for injuries negligently inflicted by their employers.' " Id. at 518 
(quoting 
Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 362 (1952)). 
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Consequently, Ahern is closer to Callen, and while it 
supports the notion that releases are not per se invalid 
under FELA, it does not shed much light on the validity of 
the general releases at issue here. To the extent there is a 
key to understanding this question, it may be found in 
Callen where the court said parties may settle "[w]here 
controversies exist as to whether there is liability, and if so 
for how much." 
 
D. 
 
Not surprisingly, lower courts that have addressed this 
issue have disagreed on the proper interpretation of S 5. 
Some courts, including the district court here, have held 
that general releases do not contravene the purposes of 
FELA and may bar a subsequent claim. See, e.g., Wilson v. 
CSX Transp., Inc., Civil Action No. 91-1398, slip op. (W.D. 
Pa. 1994); Williams v. Norfolk Southern Corp., CA 1:92-CV- 
545-HTW (N.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 1993); Satterfield v. CSX 
Transp., Inc., No. 93-002-R (W.D. Va. Dec. 22, 1993). 
Others have refused to allow a defendant to use a 
previously executed general release to block a subsequent 
FELA claim. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 
104 F.3d 89 (6th Cir. 1997); Lanham, 1995 WL 368171 
(E.D. Pa. June 21, 1995); Manis v. CSX Transp., Inc., 806 
F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1992). 
 
As we have noted, the district court here gave great 
weight to the termination of plaintiff's employment. 
Because the parties severed and terminated their 
relationship thus "buying [their] peace," the court reasoned 
the general release of claims signed by plaintiffs barred any 
subsequent claims for unrelated injuries. 
 
The contrary view has been set forth by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Babbitt, and 
appears to establish a broad, legal rule prohibiting the use 
of general releases in cases such as this. The plaintiffs in 
Babbitt were former railroad employees who signed 
Resignation and Release Agreements as part Norfolk's 
Voluntary Separation Program. Subsequently, plaintiffs 
brought FELA claims for occupational hearing loss, and the 
district court granted defendant's motion for summary 
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judgment, finding the releases barred plaintiffs' claims. The 
Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that "[t]o be valid, a release 
must reflect a bargained-for settlement of a known claim for 
a specific injury, as contrasted with an attempt to 
extinguish potential future claims the employee might have 
arising from the injuries known or unknown by him." 104 
F.3d at 93. 
 
Conrail contends that Babbitt is distinguishable on its 
facts because the releases in Babbitt were part of a 
"Voluntary Separation Program" which offered early 
retirement to railroad employees. Rather than the result of 
compromise of claims, the releases were a take-it-or-leave-it 
option offered to all employees. By contrast, the releases at 
issue here were all negotiated as part of the settlement of 
an existing claim - each was the result of arms-length 
bargaining between the plaintiff, his counsel, and the 
defendant railroad. No case cited by plaintiffs prohibiting 
general releases corresponds to the facts here. In both 
Lanham, 1995 WL 368171 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 1995), and 
Manis, 806 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1992), cited by 
plaintiffs to support a broad reading of S 5, the courts 
focused on the nature of the releases signed, which were 
expressly limited to prior injuries and thus were not 
"general" releases of all claims. 
 
III. 
 
To be valid under FELA, a release must at least have 
been executed as part of a negotiation settling a dispute 
between the employee and the employer. Schubert and 
Duncan hold that a release of FELA claims given as a 
condition of employment, or signed without negotiation, is 
void under S 5. As noted, the holding in Babbitt was based 
in part on the fact that the releases formed part of a 
voluntary separation program, and were not the product of 
negotiations settling a claim. See also Damron v. Norfolk & 
Western Railway Co., 925 F. Supp. 520, 525 (N.D. Ohio 
1995). 
 
It is also clear that an employer may not demand a 
release against potential claims as a condition of 
employment. The language of S 5 focuses on whether the 
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employer is attempting to evade liability. Schubert 
invalidates those releases whose only purpose is to deprive 
employees of their FELA rights. Schubert, 224 U.S. 603 
(1912); see also S. Rep. 460, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 
(1908); H.R. Rep. 1386, 60th Cong. 1st Sess. 6 (1908). But 
as noted, Callen permits an employer and an employee to 
negotiate a release of existing claims. 
 
As the district court here noted, and review of the case 
law confirms, "FELA cases are inherently fact-bound." 
Wicker at 18. The evaluation of the parties' intent at the 
time the agreement was made is an essential element of 
this inquiry. See, e.g., Lanham, 1995 WL 368171 at *1; 
Forry, 837 F.2d at 263; Manis, 806 F. Supp. at 179. In 
Lanham, for example, the court's decision turned on its 
belief that the release was intended to apply to the 
employee's earlier injury only, and could not bar a claim for 
subsequent injury. Lanham at *1.8  The Forry court also 
noted that the "meaning to be given to the words of a 
contract must be the one that carries the intent of the 
parties as determined by the circumstances under which 
the contract was made." 837 F.2d at 263. 
 
Examination of the parties' intent raises the troublesome 
question whether a general release in FELA cases is merely 
an engine by which an employer can evade FELA liability, 
or represents a rational and considered way to resolve 
claims and liabilities. On the one hand, FELA's underlying 
goal of allowing liberal recovery might counsel a finding 
that a general release of claims permits the employer to 
avoid FELA liability altogether and therefore violates S 5. 
But the Supreme Court appears to have rejected this view 
in Callen, permitting releases which "compromis[e] a 
claimed liability and to that extent recogniz[e] its 
possibility." 332 U.S. at 631. The question remains whether 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The plaintiffs, attempting to distinguish the Lanham decision from the 
Wilson decision relied on by the district court, argue that "the railroad 
in 
Lanham was unsuccessful [at avoiding liability] because of the protection 
provided by 45 U.S.C. Section 55." Plaintiffs' Brief at 16. As Conrail 
points out, however, the Lanham court's analysis turned on the specific 
language of the release and the intent of the parties, and not on some 
general prohibition grounded in the language ofS 55. Consequently, the 
Lanham court's reference to 45 U.S.C. S 55 is dictum. 
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there is a way to protect employees' statutory rights while 
also upholding the parties' right to settle claims by 
contract. 
 
A bright line rule like the one set forth in Babbitt, limiting 
the release to those injuries known to the employee at the 
time the release is executed, has the benefit of 
predictability. Under Babbitt, "a release must reflect a 
bargained-for-settlement of a known claim for a specific 
injury, as contrasted with an attempt to extinguish 
potential future claims the employee might have arising 
from injuries known or unknown by him." 104 F.3d at 93. 
The Sixth Circuit noted that the releases in Shubert and 
Duncan were void because they "granted general immunity 
to the railroad as opposed to addressing a specific instance 
of disputed liability." Id. 
 
Yet, it is entirely conceivable that both employee and 
employer could fully comprehend future risks and potential 
liabilities and, for different reasons, want an immediate and 
permanent settlement. The employer may desire to quantify 
and limit its future liabilities and the employee may desire 
an immediate settlement rather than waiting to see if 
injuries develop in the future. To put it another way, the 
parties may want to settle controversies about potential 
liability and damages related to known risks even if there is 
no present manifestation of injury. 
 
The question still remains whether a rule allowing parties 
to release claims related to known risks rather than known 
injuries reflects FELA's remedial goals. We believe it does. 
We hold that a release does not violate S 5 provided it is 
executed for valid consideration as part of a settlement, and 
the scope of the release is limited to those risks which are 
known to the parties at the time the release is signed. 
Claims relating to unknown risks do not constitute 
"controversies," and may not be waived underS 5 of FELA. 
See Callen, 332 U.S. at 631. For this reason, a release that 
spells out the quantity, location and duration of potential 
risks to which the employee has been exposed -- for 
example toxic exposure -- allowing the employee to make a 
reasoned decision whether to release the employer from 
liability for future injuries of specifically known risks does 
not violate S 5 of FELA. 
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To the extent that a release chronicles the scope and 
duration of the known risks, it would supply strong 
evidence in support of the release defense. But we are wary 
of making the validity of the release turn on the writing 
alone because of the ease in writing detailed boiler plate 
agreements; draft releases might well include an extensive 
catalog of every chemical and hazard known to railroad 
employment. For this reason, we think the written release 
should not be conclusive. We recognize that what is 
involved is a fact-intensive process, but trial courts are 
competent to make these kinds of determinations. While 
the elusiveness of any such determination might counsel in 
favor of a bright-line rule such as the Sixth Circuit adopted 
in Babbitt, we decline to adopt one here. 
 
Instead, we conclude that a release may be strong, but 
not conclusive, evidence of the parties' intent. Where a 
specific known risk or malady is not mentioned in the 
release, it would seem difficult for the employer to show it 
was known to the employee and that he or she intended to 
release liability for it. Furthermore, where a release merely 
details a laundry list of diseases or hazards, the employee 
may attack that release as boiler plate, not reflecting his or 
her intent. We recognize that this is a different (and more 
difficult) standard for railroad employers than is typical in 
non-FELA situations, but given the Supreme Court's pro- 
employee construction of the FELA, see Kernaw v. American 
Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 432 (1958) ("it is clear that the 
general congressional intent was to provide liberal recovery 
for injured workers"); Boyd, 338 U.S. at 265 ("Congress 
wanted Section 5 to have the full effect that its 
comprehensive phraseology implies.") (internal quotation 
omitted), we adopt it. 
 
IV. 
 
Applying this standard, we hold that the releases in 
question are invalid under S 5 of FELA. While there is little 
doubt the parties were involved in settling claims, the 
question of the parties' intent is more problematic. 
 
As a general matter, the language of the releases appears 
to recite a standard waiver of liability. Even though there is 
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no factual dispute that the agreements were reached during 
settlement negotiations, and that plaintiffs were all 
represented by counsel, the releases do not demonstrate 
the parties understood, let alone addressed or discussed, 
the scope of the claims being waived. For example, the 
McKee and Weaver releases are short, pro forma waivers, 
and do not indicate the parties negotiated any part of the 
releases other than the amount of settlement. At the other 
extreme, the releases signed by Wicker and Kleiner are 
more detailed, blanket releases which attempt to cover all 
potential liabilities. But these releases merely recite a series 
of generic hazards to which Wicker and Kleiner might have 
been exposed, rather than specific risks the employees 
faced during the course of their employment. Consequently, 
the releases do not demonstrate the employees knew of the 
actual risks to which they were exposed and from which 
the employer was being released. Even the Kaltenbrunner 
release, which contains a special exclusion for claims 
relating to carpal tunnel syndrome, does not recite that 
plaintiff was aware of and understood the other risks to 
which he was exposed. Consequently, there is no evidence 
that any of the plaintiffs, despite being represented by 
counsel, was aware of the potential health risks to which he 
had been exposed. Therefore, they could not have properly 
waived these claims. 
 
Conrail contends that even if the releases apply only to 
injuries plaintiffs were aware of at the time they signed the 
releases, their claims here are still barred because they had 
knowledge of at least some of their symptoms. Although 
plaintiffs testified they were aware of certain symptoms 
when they signed the releases, the record does not 
demonstrate that they knew that these symptoms were 
related to their exposure to toxic chemicals at Conrail's 
plant. To the contrary, plaintiffs testified they did not 
connect the symptoms with their chemical exposure until 
after they had signed the releases, and that they were not 
aware of the risks associated with the various chemicals 
used at Conrail's facility. Therefore, the releases could not 
have settled claims with respect to those risks, and cannot 
bar plaintiffs' claims. 
 
As noted, we hold that S 5 of FELA allows an employer to 
negotiate a release of claims with an employee provided the 
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release is limited to those risks which are known by the 
parties at the time the release is negotiated. In the case 
before us, we find the releases signed by the parties violate 
S 5 because they purport to settle all claims regardless 
whether the parties knew of the potential risks. Because 
the releases cannot bar plaintiffs' FELA claims, we will 
reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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